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1. In this paper, I will examine Hume's account of the causal relation 
between character and action in morality.* Hume maintains that the 
relation between character and action is contingent, but 1 intend to show 
that his discussion suggests that the relation is necessary.^ And the 
necessity is not, as he believes, a psychological feature of spectator/ 
evaluators who would conclude, upon witnessing the performance of an 
action, that the agent of that action possesses a certain character trait. 
1 References to Hume are to the following texts: 
— A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. 
Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978); abbreviated as T, with page 
numbers given in parenthesis. The following alternative abbreviation is 
also used: T i l l , meaning Treatise Book I, Part I, Section 1. 
— An Abstract to A Treatise of Human Nature, referred to simply as 
Abstract; in the Sclby-Bigge/Nidditch edition of the Treatise, with page 
numbers given in parenthesis. 
— Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the 
Principles of Morals, 3rd. ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975); abbreviated as E, followed by page 
numbers in parenthesis. 
^Similar conclusions as I will establish in this discussion have been arrived 
at, in a more general context, by Donald W. Livingston. See his "Hume on 
Ultimate Causation," (American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1 
(January, 19711), pp. 63-70; and Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (The 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), chs. 6 and 7. 
For discussions of other aspects of Hume's conception of character and 
action sec the following: Rachael Kydd, Reason and Conduct in Hume's 
Treatise (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946), pp. 190-93; David Fate Norton, 
"Hume's Common Sense Morality," (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
5, No. 4 (April, 19761), pp. 523-43, but see particularly pp. 526-30; David 
Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 111-20; John Bricke, "Hume's Conception 
of Character," (South-Western Journal of Philosophy 5 119741), pp. 107-13; 
and, finally, Pall S. Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 91- 92; "Hume on Morality, 
Action and Character," read at the Twelfth Hume Conference held in 
Montreal, August, 1983. 
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The necessity characterises a relation between an agent's possession of a 
determinate moral character trait and his performing certain correlative 
kinds of moral actions because of that character trait. In other words, the 
necessity in question is a feature of the agent by virtue of which the agent, 
already possessing a certain moral character trait, performs the kind of 
moral actions that fbltow upon that trait. I will argue that, on such a view, 
Hume's concept of causal necessity echoes, to borrow an expression of 
Davidson's, a logical necessity.^ My discussion will no doubt have 
significant consequences for Hume's overall conception of character, as 
well as his view of moral agency, his account of freedom in morality, and 
his theory of moral responsibility. However, I will not examine those 
consequences here. Instead, I will conclude with the observation that, 
despite his claim that the concept of necessity is univocal, being only 
psychological, Hume subscribes to conflicting accounts of causal 
necessity. And this, I will suggest, is because he is confused on the issue of 
causal necessity. 
2. I begin with a brief summary of Hume's explicit account of the nature 
of causal relations in general in order to provide the background for the 
position I propose to defend. 
At Treatise Book One, Hume says that all causal relations are based 
on, and reflect, four principles: contiguity in time and place, succession, 
constant conjunction and necessary connection.4 To say of any two 
objects that they arc contiguous i9 to say that they lie next to each other 
spatio-tcmporally, and that they therefore affect each other by their 
actions. For example, billiard ball A induces motion in another billiard 
ball B because the two billiard balls touch. Indeed, it is only because the 
two balls come together that one, by its action, affects the other. 
Succession is the second principle that Hume says is essential to an 
analysis of causation. According to this principle, causes and their related 
effects do not take place simultaneously; causes take place before their 
effects and effects occur after their causes. Hume sums up the notion of 
^Donald Davidson, "Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride," (The Journal of 
Philosophy, 73 (November 4,19761), p. 751. 
4 ln the Abstract, Hume lists only three principles of causation; contiguity, 
succession and constant conjunction, saying that the concept of a cause is 
explicable only in terms of these three principles (T 649-50). But even so, 
he appeals to the principle of necessary connection in his analysis of the 
concept of a cause. As will emerge in the course of this paper, he thinks 
necessary connection presupposes constant conjunction. 
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succession as " . . . that of PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effect" 
(T 75-76). 
Third, the principle of constant conjunction. Hume says constant 
conjunction "implies no more than . . . that like objects have always been 
[found to bej plac'd in like relations of contiguity and succession" (T 88). 
That is, our idea of constant conjunction presupposes that of contiguity 
and succession between objects. But Hume notes that there is more to 
constant conjunction than simply presupposing contiguity and 
succession. Constant conjunction also entails that like causes always 
produce like effects (T 649).^ The overall importance of constant 
conjunction in Hume's theory of causation is brought out in his remark 
that if objects did not have a regular and uniform conjuction with each 
other, which conjunction we then perceive, we would never have had a 
notion of causal relations (T 400). 
Finally, the notion of necessary connection. There arc those like 
Locke and Malebranche, Hume charges, who regard necessary 
connection as a property in objects in virtue of which objects produce the 
kind of effects they are known to produce (T 157-68; cf. 90-91). Hume 
dismisses this view arguing, among other things, that if there was such a 
property in objects we should have some sense impression of it as we do of 
the already known properties of objects. Moreover, our idea of necessary 
connection should derive from that impression. However, there is no 
impression "convcy'd by our senses" from which we acquired the notion of 
necessary connection, he says, and the reason there is no such impression 
is that there is no property in objects that can produce it (T 165-66). 
Therefore, he concludes, Locke and Malebranche are mistaken in their 
views of necessary connection, and our idea of necessary connection has 
to be accounted for otherwise. 
Hume offers his own account of necessary connection, namely, that to 
speak of a necessary connection is to speak of a habit that we have, as 
observer/evaluators, to infer the occurrence of a member of a conjunctive 
pair from the actual or potential occurrence of the other member. As 
observer/evaluators, says Hume, we acquire this habit through 
experience, after we have witnessed a constant conjunction between pairs 
of object—e.g. lightning and thunder. We then naturally come to expect 
^The entailment may also go the other way, as was pointed out to me by 
the referee of this paper for the 1987 meetings of the Canadian 
Philosophical Association. (1 later learnt that the referee was John P. 
Wright. See also note 13) 
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cither member upon the putative appearance of the other. Consequent 
upon this expectation, we always readily infer the occurrence of one 
member from the occurrence of the other. It is this propensity in us to 
draw inferences about members in a conjunctive set that Hume 
characterises as a necessary connection. (In consonance with his 
empiricist maxim that all ideas be traced to an antecedent impression, 
Hume identifies this mental propensity with a reflective impression, thus 
providing the impression from which he says originated our idea of 
necessary connection.) Accordingly, he defines necessary connection as 
"nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to 
effects and from effects to causes, according to their expericne'd union." 
Indeed, in summing up his view of causal necessity, Hume says that 
necessity is "something, that exists in the mind, not in objects..." (T165-66; 
400 and 408). 
3. From this summary of the central features of Hume's theory of 
causation it can be seen that he thinks causal relations arc contingent and 
not necessary. Hume says in the Abstract that "The mind can always 
conceive any effect to follow from any cause, and indeed any event to 
follow upon another . . . " (T 650, emphasis in text). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that in his account of the relation between character and action, 
in particular, Hume simply speaks of the constant union of particular 
motives (or character traits) and the particular actions they direct, of 
particular actions "being constantly united with their proper motives" (T 
401, 404, 661), thus reflecting his basic claim that all causal relations are 
contingent. On Hume's explicit view, then, it seems logically conceivable 
that particular forms of behaviour which usually originate from specific 
moral character traits be produced by features of persons other than 
those character traits. For example, the form of behaviour we normally 
describe as virtuous-i.e. when it originates from a virtuous character trait— 
-can conceivably be produced by any but such a trait. Of course, Hume 
would not characterise such behaviour as virtuous. But this, as I will argue, 
is because he regards a moral action to be a specific kind of behaviour, 
one that is necessarily (in the non- psychological sense) connected with its 
cause. And it is this conception of causal necessity that contravenes his 
official thesis. For the present, however, I wish also to point out that 
Hume, consistent with his official position, believes that character traits 
may exist without ever giving rise to their correlative moral actions, even 
when all the relevant conditions obtain. These include: (a) the existence of 
the situation requiring action; (b) the agent's perception or recognition of 
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the situation; and (c) the absence of external constraints on the agent. 6 
He describes a situation (to which 1 shall again refer) in which a person 
purportedly virtuous is incapacitated by such circumstances as isolation 
in a desert or imprisonment in a dungeon from manifesting his 
virtuousness in action (T 584). 
The question that immediately arises is whether or not Hume's 
discussion of the causal relation between character and action show the 
relation to be contingent as he might want us to believe. This question is 
easily given a negative answer as soon as one attends to his account of the 
nature of liberty and necessity given at Treatise 2 3 1 and 2 3 2. In that 
discussion Hume endeavours to show that, contra the libertarians, human 
actions are causally determined, and he begins with an account of the 
nature of the actions of material objects, explaining that whatever 
observations he makes about the behaviour of material objects will also 
be true, mutatis mutandis, of the conduct of human beings (T 403). 
Accordingly, he directs attention to the generally acknowledged view 
about the nature of the actions of material objects, namely, that "the 
actions of external objects are necessary, and that in the communication 
of their motion, in their attraction, and mutual cohesion, there are not the 
least traces of indifference or liberty." Subscribing to that view, Hume 
says that 
Every object is dctermin'd by an absolute fate to a 
certain degree and direction of its motion, and can no 
more depart from that precise line, in which it moves, 
than it can convert itself into an angel, or spirit, or any 
superior substance. The actions, therefore, of matter are 
to be regarded as instances of necessary actions; and 
whatever is in this respect on the same footing with 
matter, must be acknowledg'd to be necessary (T 399-
400). 
1 will first bring out a major implication of Hume's view in the above-
quoted passage for his overall conception of causal determination and 
then go on to review his account of the causal relation between character 
and action. To that end I want to note at once that, contrary to Hume's 
explicit view in which causal necessity is defined in psychological terms, 
the sense of causal determination (or necessitation) in this passage is 
etiological with logical overtones. Hume is making a point about the kind 
6Cf. Bricke, "Hume's Conception of Character," pp. 109-10. 
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of behaviour that material objects are incapable of exhibiting—namely, 
purposive behaviour—because of their nature as inanimate entities. (And 
by implication it is a statement about the kind of behaviour that material 
objects can exhibit.) A material object, he says, "can no more depart from 
that precise line in which it moves, than it can convert itself into an angel, 
or spirit, or superior substance." The suggestion in this statement is, 
clearly, that it is impossible for material objects to exhibit purposive forms 
of behaviour just as it is impossible for them to transform themselves into 
superior non-material entities. But, contra what Hume might think, the 
impossibility he is describing is not empirical. In other words, Hume is 
not saying that it is a contingent fact that an object endowed with only 
material-object attributes exhibit non-purposive forms of behaviour, but 
that such an object could (conceivably) exhibit purposive forms of 
behaviour. His claim is much stronger: on the one hand, he is saying that 
the forms of behaviour material objects exhibit cannot but be what they 
arc given the nature of those objects; or, more succinctly, that the 
behaviour of material objects is ontologically rooted in the kind of 
characteristics possessed by (and essential to) those objects. And on the 
other hand he seems to be suggesting that it is logically impossible for a 
material object, being the kind of entity it is, to exhibit forms of behaviour 
that cannot conceivably originate from the kind of characteristics with 
which entities of that kind are endowed. This logical impossibility comes 
out, I suggest, in Hume's statement that if material objects can 
conceivably exhibit purposive forms of behaviour then they can also 
transform themselves into superior non-material entities. Hume is 
certainly asserting the contrapositive of this view, namely, that material 
objects can do neither. Of course, on such a view it may be contingent 
that material objects possess material-object characteristics but not that 
they exhibit non-purposive conduct. I submit that this is the reason Hume 
describes the behaviour of material objects as being determined "by an 
absolute fate." As will be seen shortly similar considerations will apply to 
brings which exhibit purposive conduct, in particular, humans. 
It might perhaps be said that, barring the passage on which I have 
based my argument, Hume is otherwise consistent in his psychological 
account of causal necessity. In the paragraph immediately following the 
section 1 elaborated, the objection might continue, Hume insists that 
necessity is nothing but an inference of the mind brought about by our 
experiencing a constant and regular sequence. Moreover, he there makes 
explicit that only two factors are essential to necessity: the constant 
conjunction and the inference of the mind. Thus, my claim that he offers a 
non-psychological account of causal necessity is inaccurate. 
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But this objection, far from redeeming Hume, provides a basis for 
one to argue that he is confused over the issue of causal necessity. For he 
seems to be simultaneously explaining necessity in terms of the property 
of objects and declaring that necessity is nothing but an inference of the 
mind. His discussion in the passage I cited above clearly shows him 
deviating from his psychological account of causal necessity. His concern 
in that passage is with the nature of material objects and not with the 
mental operations of observer/evaluators who may (or may not) have 
observed those objects. On this new view, material objects will, it seems, 
exhibit non-purposive forms of behaviour whether or not there are 
sentient beings to observe them. Moreover, material objects cannot even 
be conceived to exhibit any but non-purposive forms of behaviour. 
Because the necessity in question is anything but a mental determination 
of observer/evaluators the conclusion one must draw is that, despite 
Hume's explicit assertions to the contrary, he does put forward an account 
of causal necessity that is non-psychological; an account in which causal 
necessity is etiological, meaning that the necessity is grounded in the 
nature of material objects. Moreover, this etiological account of causal 
necessity has overtones of a logical necessity. 
4. Doubtless, Hume is unaware that he advances this etiological/logical 
account of causal necessity, for he maintains that necessity is a univocal 
concept characterising the mental operations of human beings who may 
have observed regularly conjoined states of affairs: 
The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of ttie 
mind, is not properly a quality in the agent, but in any 
thinking or intelligent being, who may consider the 
action, and consists in the determination of his thought 
to infer its existence from some preceding objects (T 408, 
emphasis added)7 
Hume even intends his illustrations of causal necessity to uphold this 
view. For example, in Treatise Book One, he remarks that a traveller who 
encounters a river stops in his tracks because he "foresees" the 
consequences of his proceeding forward (T 103). Hume advances a similar 
7 C f . Hume's remark in Book One: 
. . . there is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one 
kind of cause, and that the common distinction betwixt 
moral and physical necessity is without any foundation in 
nature (T 171, emphasis in text). 
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view in Book Two, in saying that a prisoner without wealth or connection 
soon "discovers" that, unless he breaks down the walls and bars 
surrounding him, it is otherwise impossible for him to be out of prison. 
And that very prisoner, Hume continues, upon being conducted to the 
scaffold, "foresees" his death with certainty both from the constancy and 
fidelity of the guards and from the axe or wheel to be used to execute him 
(T406). 
These illustrations rightly uphold Hume's explicit view that necessity 
is a psychological feature of human beings who may have directly or 
indirectly experienced certain regularly conjoined sequences of events or 
states of affairs. But for all that Hume keeps using necessity in at least the 
non-psychological/ etiological sense I have claimed, as is evident from the 
following passage: 
We must certainly allow, that the cohesion of the 
parts of matter arises from natural and necessary 
principles, whatever difficulty we may find in explaining 
them: And for a like reason we must allow, that human 
society is founded on like principles; and our reason in 
the latter case, is better than even that in the former; 
because we not only observe, that men always seek 
society but can also explain the principles, on which this 
universal propensity is founded (T 401-02, all but last 
emphasis added). 
The necessary principles of which Hume speaks in this passage are 
not the features of sentient beings involving the drawing of causal 
inferences. Rather, they are characteristics of entities, material objects 
and human beings, which make each of those kinds of entities behave as 
they do. Material objects exhibit non-purposive forms of behaviour 
because of the kind of attributes with which they arc endowed. And 
human beings come together to form societies because, as Hume himself 
says elsewhere, individually, man is naturally incapable of providing for all 
his needs. "Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise 
himself up to an equality with his fellow creatures (i.e. the lower animals], 
and even acqtiirc a superiority above them" (T 485). In both cases, the 
necessity in the behaviour of the entities in question is etiological.® 
8 I t is worth pointing out that Hume speaks of certain "secret powers," 
certain "natural powers and principles" that material objects possess, 
powers and principles that, according to him, make material objects 
CAUSAL 157 
5. In light of the preceding discussion 1 want now to review Hume's 
conception of the causal relation between character and action. 1 will 
concentrate only on his discussion of the character trait of virtuousness 
and its relation to virtuous actions, but the considerations 1 will bring to 
bear on my review can also be applied, with appropriate adjustments, to 
Hume's entire catalogue of moral virtues and vices. To begin, then, 1 will 
cite a few passages from Treatise 3 3 1 which suggest that, according to 
Hume's discussion, the relation between virtuousness and virtuous actions 
is necessary, and that the necessity is in the first place etiological. 
According to Hume, 
Where a person is possess'd of a character, that in its 
natural tendency is beneficial to society, we esteem him 
virtuous, and are delighted with the view of his character, 
even tho' particular accidents prevent its operation, and 
behave as they do. Hume even speaks of a harmony that nature has 
"established among external objects" by endowing those objects with 
secret powers and principles. Cranted, he says also that "we are ignorant of 
those powers and forces" governing the regular course of the behaviour of 
those entities (E 30-42; 55; and T 652). But these remarks simply show that 
he is confused on the subject of causal necessity, because while denying 
that necessity is a feature of entities, he is at the same time expressing the 
contrary view. 
John P. Wright fails to see this confusion in Hume when he says that 
Hume never denied that causal necessity is a feature of entities. 
According to Wright, Hume says only that "we have no idea of necessity, 
power or agency of causes, not that there is no necessity, power or agency 
in the objects themselves" (The Sceptical Realism of David Hume 
1 Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1983J p. 132, emphasis in text). It 
seems to have completely escaped Wright that any such claim made by 
Hume is inconsistent with Hume's official position, as summed up in 
passages I have cited showing that he thinks necessity is a univocal 
concept. Indeed, that Hume is adamant on this issue can again be seen 
very clearly when one considers his view of moral necessity (or, as he calls 
it, moral evidence). He defines moral necessity as "nothing but a 
conclusion concerning the actions of men, dcriv'd from a consideration of 
their motives, temper and situation," and goes on to say that natural and 
moral evidence "aptly . . . cement together" to form one chain of argument 
between them (T 404, 406). The chain of argument of which he is here 
speaking is that causal necessity is a mental feature of 
spcctator/evaluators. 
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incapacitate him from being serviceable to his friends 
and country. Virtue in rags is still virtue; and the love, 
which it procures, attends a man into a dungeon or 
dcsart, where the virtue can no longer be exerted in 
action, and is lost to all the world. 
In the succeeding paragraph Hume reinforces this view arguing that, 
although " Tis sufficient if every thing be compleat in the object itself," we 
do not cease to approve of a person with a virtuous character because he 
can no longer exercise his virtuousness in action.^Humc of course 
observes that we arc "more affected" by a person's character when that 
character can be put into action than when it remains simply a 
potentiality. But even so, he argues, "we do not say that it (the exerted 
character! is more virtuous, (nlor that we esteem it the more." He 
illustrates this point by saying that we feel pleased with a house that is 
designed to accommodate all aspects of life, although we are also aware 
that no one will ever occupy it. Similarly, we are delighted with a country 
whose land is potentially fertile and climate potentially good when we 
consider the happiness such a country would provide for its inhabitants, 
all the while cognisant of the fact that the country is at present both a 
desert and is uninhabited (T 584-85). 
Throughout this discussion Hume's explicit concern is with the 
sentiment of esteem and approval that we, as spectator/evaluators, 
normally feci towards a person whom we already know to be virtuous, even 
though that person may never again perform virtuous actions. (See also 
his discussion at T 348-49.) But a careful examination of the passages 
reveals that he is concerned also, albeit implicitly, with virtuousness itself, 
as a moral quality in a person, a quality that both inheres in a person and 
would causally direct that person's morally significant actions whether or 
not there arc spectators. Consider his assertion that "Virtue in rags is still 
virtue; and the love, which it procures, attends a man into a dungeon or 
dcsart, where the virtue can no longer be exerted in action, and is lost to 
all the world" (Emphasis added). According to this statement, a person 
does not cease to be virtuous because he is locked up in a dungeon or is 
9Thc passage continues: 
...where any object, in all its parts,is fitted to attain an 
agreeable cnd,it naturally gives us pleasure, and is 
estcem'd beautiful, even tho' some external 
circumstances be wanting to render it altogether 
effectual (T 584). 
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isolated in a desert. On the contrary, he continues to be virtuous, and 
because of this, his virtuousness, although a potentiality, still affects us: it 
elicits our esteem for, and approval of, the person as if the person was 
actually capable of performing virtuous actions. To say however that a 
person is still virtuous when his virtuousness is lost to all the world, is to say 
that he is characterised by certain moral properties that would causally 
direct him to perform virtuous actions when the situation requiring that he 
do so exists and all other conditions are fulfilled. Moreover, the person's 
performance of those actions is not contingent upon the presence of 
spectator/evaluators. Regardless of the presence (or absence) of 
spectator/ evaluators, he would perform those actions. Indeed, Hume's 
general position is that virtuousness, as a moral character trait, or a 
relatively permanent mental feature imbued with a specific moral quality, 
inheres in a person as the quality redness (say) inheres in a substance (a 
book, for example). And the person's possession of this moral feature ib a 
necessary (even though not a sufficient) condition for him to exhibit the 
specific kind of morally relevant form of behaviour called a virtuous 
action, when appropriate conditions obtain. 
As in the case of material objects, the causal direction here is 
etiological with logical overtones. The causal direction is etiological 
because, for Hume, virtuous actions have their ontological basis in 
virtuous character traits. Hume's discussion of the nature of moral action 
makes this point even clearer. He believes that a given form of behaviour 
qualifies as a morally relevant action if and only if it is produced by, and 
hence is reflective of, a specific moral feature in a person. Thus he writes: 
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a 
sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon 
durable principles of the mind, which extend over the 
whole conduct, and enter into the personal character. 
Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant 
principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or 
humility; and consequently are never consider'd in 
morality (T 575, emphasis in text; cf. 348-49,479 and 411). 
Hume even regards morally relevant actions as effects of mental 
features that have moral qualities, mental features that are character 
traits. He repeatedly says moral actions "proceed from," and are 
therefore "signs or indications" of, durable mental principles that comprise 
a person's character. Accordingly, he argues that, given that a person is 
characterised by a virtuous mental quality—meaning that a person has a 
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virtuous character trait—it is the mental quality that directs the person's 
virtuous actions and actually "bestows" a like moral quality on them (T 
477-78, cf. 575). Saying then that a given form of behaviour is a virtuous 
action entails that the behaviour is endowed with the moral quality of 
virtuousness; in fact, that it "derived," its virtuousness from a specific 
mental/ moral feature of the person (T 478). 
One is to conclude from such a view that the performance of any 
moral action, in this case a virtuous action, presupposes the existence in 
the agent of the appropriate character trait that singularly gives rise to 
that action. Thus, given that a person lacks a virtuous character trait it is 
in no xvay possible for him to perform a virtuous action; not the relevant 
kind of action that can, in Hume's sense, only be performed by a person 
with a virtuous character trait. Alternatively put, virtuousness is the 
property in the absence of which a person cannot possibly perform 
virtuous actions, or that any action he produces be the same as that which 
could be produced by a person endowed with that character trait. And 
more generally, inasmuch as Hume views moral actions as effects of 
specific moral causes, it is just not possible that those moral effects be 
produced by anything other than their respective moral causes. 
Conversely, given that a certain character trait exists, then necessarily, it 
would give rise to the kind of actions that it alone produces, when all the 
relevant conditions are satisfied, including the agent's perception of the 
situation in which he should act. I speak of a necessity in the performance 
of moral actions because Hume thinks that the exercise (or 
manifestation) of character traits in action is a response that naturally 
ensues from agents when the latter are in appropriate situations and all 
other relevant conditions are fulfilled.^ He says at Treatise 3 2 1 that our 
ascriptions of blame are made always on the supposition that the agent 
whose conduct is being evaluated failed to perform the kind of action he 
ought to have performed in the given situation. And this failure reflects 
the agent's lack of the appropriate character trait (or motive) that should 
™A comparison can here be made between an agent's performance of a 
moral action, wherein that performance is a reaction to a specific (actual 
or putative) state of affairs, and the arousal of the moral sentiments in an 
impartial spectator, the sentiments through which that spectator feels 
moral approval and disapproval in reaction to instances of virtue and vice. 
According to Hume, each moral sentiment "arises" (T 469,472); it "ensues" 
(E 290); and we "naturally" and "unavoidably feel" it "given the structure of 
human nature" (T 466, E 293). 
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have directed him to act . 1 1 For this reason we find the agent morally 
culpable for his failure to act. On the other hand, Hume continues, we 
retract our blame if we discover that the agent had the character trait in 
question but, "by some circumstances IhithertoJ unknown to us," was 
hindered from manifesting that trait in action (T 477-78). Of course, Hume 
is assuming that we normally hold persons responsible for their lack of 
certain character traits, otherwise he would not say that we blame a 
person for his failure to perform actions directed by a given character 
trait. But I will not pursue this matter here as it is not central to my 
concern. What I wish to bring out by citing these remarks is that Hume, by 
his view that when we assign blame to a person for failing to perform an 
action we are in fact blaming him for his lacking the character trait which 
directs that kind of action, seems to be implying that if the person had had 
the character trait he could not but have performed the required action. 
And in that case we would have praised him. 
If this is a correct interpretation of Hume then, on his view, a virtuous 
person cannot but respond to a putative case of suffering when he 
perceives the situation correctly and is not constrained by external factors. 
Indeed, it would seem that, for Hume, a ground for withholding 
virtuousness to a person is for the person to fail to perform the relevant 
kind of action when appropriate circumstances obtain, he perceives the 
situation correctly and is not constrained by unfortunate circumstances. 
It is for this reason that I think it accurate to say that Hume's discussion 
suggests that virtuous actions are etiologically necessitated by virtuous 
character traits. As I have already remarked, regardless of the presence of 
spectator/evaluators, a virtuous person cannot but perform virtuous 
actions in appropriate situations. But the necessity is also logical because 
a contradiction would follow in saying that a virtuous action can exist in 
the absence of a virtuous character trait. In Hume's theory, a form of 
behaviour may, in every respect except origin, resemble another that 
originates from a virtuous character trait. The former is not, however, a 
1 1 It is of course debatable that Hume gives motive and character the 
same signification, but I will not go into that matter here. I assume that he 
treats both these terms as equivalent, cognisant of the fact that he is not 
altogether clear on his uses of the term motive. For example, he at times 
uses motive to mean an actuating principle, as when he speaks of reason 
and passion as the "influencing motives of the will" (T 413). But he also 
speaks of the mental items that qualify us for moral praise and blame as 
motives, as in the passage in question. Further, he speaks of rewards and 
punishments as motives to moral good and away from moral evil, 
respectively (T 410 and 609). 
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virtuous action. The reason for this is that he has a very strict conception of 
moral action, according to which a form of behaviour qualifies as a moral 
action if and only if it is imbued with, and hence reflects, a specific moral 
quality in a person's character. This conception of a moral action logically 
prohibits him from saying that character and action, qua items in a causal 
chain, are contingently related. The contingency thesis of causation 
implies that we can conceive of a moral action as originating from a 
source other than that alone which produces it and which it externalizes— 
an implication Hume explicitly rejects. But in rejecting this position 
(which is the logical consequence of his official doctrine), and in 
maintaining the strict conception of moral action I have claimed, Hume is 
tacitly advancing the view that the causation between character and 
action is necessary in a non-psychological sense. Indeed, it is only on the 
basis of this view of necessity that we can make intelligible his assertion 
that a person's action is evidence of his character and, more importantly, 
that a person, in being morally appraised for his actions, is in fact being 
morally appraised for his character (T 411,477-78, and 575) . 1 2 
6. I have shown that, according to Hume's discussion of the relation 
between character and action, the moral actions a person performs have 
^Some may say that the contingency thesis implies only that while a 
virtuous action is necessarily the product of a virtuous character—since 
this is what it means to call an action virtuous in Hume's system— the 
converse need not necessarily obtain. That is, a virtuous character need 
not necessarily produce virtuous actions. Cognisant of this point, I insist 
nevertheless that the proper way of expressing Hume's view of the 
relation between character and action is that an action is virtuous if and 
only if (and not simply only if) it is produced by the appropriate character 
trait. My reason for this view is that much else that Hume says both about 
the nature of moral action and of the relation between character and 
action is at variance with the general claims of the contingency thesis. 
Indeed, a reason for not adopting that thesis here is that it would commit 
Hume to the view that moral actions can conceivably be produced by 
features of agents other than their moral characters. For, be it 
remembered, the thesis is that events, or more generally states of affairs in 
the world, are all loose and unconnected; there is nothing that cements 
any two natural phenomena together, hence anything might arise from 
anything! Hume's discussion seems, however, to reject this fundamental 
tenet of the contingency thesis of causation. Moreover, his theory of moral 
valuation is intelligible precisely because it depends on a conception of 
the relation between character and action that cuts across his own radical 
and oft-cited view of the constant but contingent union of the items in a 
causal relation. 
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their logical and ontological basis in the mental features that comprise the 
person's character, mental features given which the person performs 
certain kinds of actions, and in the absence of which he cannot 
conceivably perform those kinds of actions. In my view, this suggests that, 
notwithstanding Hume's official pronouncements to the contrary, the 
relation between character and action is both etiologically and logically 
necessary. However, 1 do not mean to deny validity in the psychological 
sense of necessity which Hume has in mind in asserting that it is upon the 
principles of necessity that persons are ascribed merit or demerit for their 
actions (T 411, cf. 404-05). Hume is clearly correct in saying that our 
ascription of moral epithets to persons is based on experience, in the sense 
that we already know from experience that particular kinds of actions only 
derive from particular kinds of character traits with which they are 
constantly conjoined. Thus, when we experience an instance of a certain 
kind of action, a virtuous action, for example, we conclude that the agent of 
that action is virtuous, meaning that he has a virtuous character trait. But 
my point is that this is not the sense of causal necessity that comes 
through in his discussion of the behaviour of entities as instances of 
necessary actions. His discussion of the relation between character and 
action in morality shows this relation to be necessary, but the necessity 
characterises a person's possession of determinate moral features and his 
performing certain correlative kinds of moral actions because of those 
moral features. Thus, the kind of character trait a person has may indeed 
be contingent, but not the kinds of actions he performs by virtue of his 
character trait. Hume's claim, then, that causal necessity here, as 
elsewhere, is a psychological phenomenon that occurs in spectator/ 
evaluators is clearly mistaken. The conclusion I will therefore draw from 
my discussion is that there is a discrepancy between Hume's explicit claim 
about, and his discussion of, the causal relation between character and 
action. His explicit claim is that 'There is no object (event, state of affairs], 
which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects 
(events, states of affairs] in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas 
which we form of them" (T 86-87). But his discussion commits him to the 
stronger view that there are some objects or states of affairs, namely, 
character and action, that imply the existence of others. The discrepancy 
between Hume's explicit claim and his implicit commitment is, in my 
view, evidence that (i) he is confused about the issue of causal necessity, 
because while outrightly rejecting the Lockean and Cartesian views he is 
1M AUSLECUNG 
1 3 This paper was originally presented at the 31st Annual Meetings of the 
Canadian Philosophical Association in Hamilton, Ontario, 24th-27th May, 
1987. 1 am grateful to David Norton and Harry Bracken for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. I am also grateful to the reviewers of 
Auslegung for comments which I found very helpful in my discussion of 
the nature of moral action in Hume's thought. 
tacitly advancing a similar view; and that (ii) the concept of necessity is not 
univocal even in his own system.1 ^  
